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Abstract 
The literature on skill-biased technical change has examined the role of skills in the 
adoption of new technology. Here the focus is on the creation of new technology, that is, 
innovation. Low skill firms are hypothesized to benefit less from innovation activities, 
particularly collaborative research and development (R&D). In other words, skills and 
innovation are complementary. Complementarities associated with innovation may 
generate persistent differences in firm behavior and performance. Results from a panel of 
manufacturing firms indicate that technical skills reinforce the profitability effects of 
innovation and R&D collaboration. Skills, collaboration, and innovation form a system of 
interdependent activities. 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
The view of innovation as the main engine of long-run economic development is 
widespread. It seems that the social returns to innovation can be enormous, yet at the level 
of individual firms it is not evident that the returns to innovation investments are always 
positive. Teece (1986) documented this phenomenon with case studies of product 
innovations. He concluded that profiting from innovation depends on access to 
complementary capabilities, especially in marketing and distribution, without which the 
innovative idea cannot be profitably commercialized.  
Similarly, recent literature on research joint ventures and strategic alliances has observed 
that, despite the proliferation of these arrangements, it is difficult to benefit from joint 
innovation projects (Kogut 1989; Harrigan 1988). Economic literature on research joint 
ventures, however, does not present insights into what might be driving the high failure 
rates. This paper suggests that an important but neglected factor is firms’ existing base of 
skills and knowledge. Skills complement both internal and collaborative research and 
development (R&D). This argument can be viewed as a new angle to the debate on skill-
biased technical change (Acemoglu 1998; Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998; Machin and 
Reenen 1998), or more recently, skill-biased organizational change (Caroli and Reenen 
forthcoming). Most recently, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2001) provided a detailed analysis 
of how computers are used in firms. The findings indicate that computers substitute for 
routine cognitive and manual tasks and complement non-routine problem solving and 
interactive tasks. These effects shift the demand for labor toward highly skilled and highly 
educated people.  
In this paper it is argued that not only adoption of technology but its successful creation is 
complemented by skilled employees in the firm. This is supported by cognitive studies of 
learning (see Cohen and Levinthal 1990, for a review). Notably, the need for skilled 
employees is not limited to the R&D function. The entire innovating organization benefits 
from upskilling. In the current environment of deregulation and globalization, competition 
is increasingly based on innovation, and therefore the notion of skill-biased technical 
change is not limited to the adoption of information technology. Upskilling may be driven 
by multiple facets of technical change. 
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This argument is in line with a recent study by Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 
(forthcoming) that suggests that product or service innovation is an essential component in 
the theory of demand for skilled labor. According to case studies and surveys of managers, 
adoption of technology is motivated by the need to improve product and service offerings 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1995). Also, the organizational changes identified by Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (2000) as complementary to technology investment are intended to improve 
product and service capabilities. Clearly, innovation is involved in these recent 
developments. However, the empirical work by Brynjolfsson and his coauthors suffers 
from the lack of direct measures of innovation. The focus in the current paper is precisely 
on the process of innovation and its impact on the demand for skills. Broad-based 
innovation surveys and the employment register of the Finnish manufacturing sector enable 
a more detailed analysis of the nature of the relationship between skills and innovation.  
The idea of complementarities related to the nature of the firm is new in neither strategic 
management (the notion of “synergy”) nor business history (e.g., Chandler 1962). 
However, organizational complementarities have not been a focus of inquiry in the 
economic theory of the firm, until Milgrom and Roberts (1990; see also Holmström and 
Milgrom 1994) introduced the concept in organizational economics. Studies of 
technological change and innovation, on the other hand, have emphasized interactions 
among activities within the firm (Kline and Rosenberg 1986; Rothwell 1994) and the firm’s 
relationship with external sources of knowledge (e.g. Levin, Cohen, and Mowery 1985; 
Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Essentially, organizational interactions are seen to stem from 
the need to combine different kinds of knowledge in the innovation process. 
Complementary knowledge sources are thus the basis of organizational complementarities. 
Empirical studies of innovation provide evidence that the accumulation of knowledge may 
be a source of considerable variation in firms’ behavior and performance (e.g., Geroski, 
Machin, and Reenen 1993; Henderson and Cockburn 1996; Klette 1996). According to 
Geroski et al. (1993), a firm’s innovation record affects its profitability. They contend that 
innovation performance approximates the accumulation of knowledge capital and that this 
capital enables firms to continuously bring new products to market and improve 
productivity through process innovation. However, the fundamental factors behind 
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differences in knowledge accumulation remain unknown. If possessing knowledge capital 
translates into improved market performance, and any firm can acquire knowledge, i.e., 
learn and innovate, then all firms facing the same opportunities should invest identically 
and no performance differences should be observed in the long run.  
In real economies firms do perform and behave differently. I suggest that one reason why 
firms may make different learning investments is the combinatory characteristics of the 
investments. The “portfolio” of investments, collaborations, and skills may have an effect 
on the marginal productivity of each of the components. If the components of a firm’s 
knowledge capital complement one another, then each is more productive in the presence 
of the others.  
Systemic effects could also explain the persistent differences in firm performance. Firms 
that initially possess some components of the “knowledge system” perceive further 
investment to be more productive, making virtuous cycles possible. In contrast, knowledge-
poor firms are less likely to recognize productive R&D investment opportunities because of 
the missing complementary components. Managers might be unaware of the 
complementarities, and creating a system of complementary skills from a nonexistent 
foundation is a risky, time-consuming, and expensive venture. There are thus significant 
adjustment costs to setting up the knowledge system. Hiring skilled employees may not be 
sufficient; employees also need to learn to use their skills in the organization. In fact, 
learning may be the key source of adjustment costs in creating the system of knowledge 
complementarities. The proposition that adjustment is not instantaneous despite strong 
positive interactions is borne out by the data used in this study: even though most firm 
observations are found in the extremes of “engages in all complementary activities” or 
“engages in no activities,” as predicted by the theory, a considerable number of firms make 
“mistakes” and end up with mixed knowledge creation portfolios. 
Knowledge accumulation processes are likely to vary across industries and sectors. Within 
manufacturing, investments in learning often include R&D, hiring skilled employees, on-
the-job learning and training, technology licensing and other intellectual property 
acquisitions, collaboration with other organizations, and designing the internal 
organizational such that it promotes communication and provides proper incentives. There 
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is an emerging literature that examines whether these learning investments and activities 
reinforce one another. In addition to the work by Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Bresnahan, as well 
as that by Caroli and Van Reenen, Geroski et al. (1993) found evidence of 
complementarities. Specifically, external and internal sources of knowledge are 
complementary in that the effects of knowledge spillovers are larger and more significant 
for innovating firms. This finding accords with the absorptive capacity argument of Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989): Internal R&D facilitates absorption of knowledge spillovers. In other 
words, internal and external knowledge are complements. Analyzing interactions among 
firms’ various internal knowledge assets, Helfat (1997) argued that there are economies of 
scope among different fields of R&D within the petroleum industry. According to her 
results, R&D in coal conversion depends positively on complementary R&D in refining.  
This paper seeks to assess the scope of interactions among firms’ skill bases, collaborative 
innovation activities, and innovation output in a profitability framework. In an earlier 
study, employees’ skills were found to impact firms’ profits (Leiponen 2000). Interestingly, 
skills interacted with one another. The positive effect of research skills on profits was 
conditioned by a sufficiently high level of “general” skills in the firm. Moreover, the 
impact of skills on profitability was larger for innovating firms than for non-innovating 
firms. This suggests that skills and innovation interact in determining economic 
performance. Here I build on these results and analyze more explicitly whether skills and 
accumulated knowledge complement R&D collaboration and innovation. The following 
section develops the hypotheses. The data are presented in section 3, and the empirical 
framework for estimating complementarities is developed in section 4. Section 5 discusses 
the empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
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2 HYPOTHESES 
Management literature has long discussed the role of interactions related to skills and 
knowledge, but few robust, cross-sectional studies exist. Nevertheless, the widely accepted 
logic of Teece’s (1986) complementary capability proposition is intuitive. Having an 
innovative idea is only one part of the successful development of a new product or process. 
To develop the idea into a well-functioning technology that can be profitably manufactured 
and marketed the firm needs high technical, marketing, and “integrative” competencies 
(Iansiti 1995; Kogut and Zander 1992). Thus, the first hypothesis to be assessed with the 
firm-level panel dataset is that to benefit from product and process innovation the firm must 
have sufficient internal competencies. In other words, a firm’s skills complement 
innovation in its effects on profitability.  
The second hypothesis concerns the profitability effects of R&D collaboration. In 
theoretical studies of the economics of R&D joint ventures (d'Aspremont and Jacquemin 
1988; Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992, and the literature building on these seminal works), 
the focus is usually on horizontal and industry-wide cooperation, and there are no 
additional organization costs associated with collaboration. As a result, collaboration is 
always socially efficient, because it enables internalizing spillovers. However, the 
relatively high failure rates of collaborative arrangements observed in empirical studies 
attest to the opposite (Harrigan 1988; Kogut 1989). Thus, in reality, R&D collaboration is 
costly and difficult. 
Empirical studies suggest that firms engage in collaborative arrangements in order to cope 
with technological complexity, reduce the uncertainty and costs of R&D, capture partners’ 
knowledge, and reduce product development time (Hagedoorn 1993; also Kogut 1988; 
Contractor and Lorange 1988; Coombs et al. 1996, among others). As in the theoretical 
literature, the reasons for not collaborating—costs of collaboration rather than benefits—
have not been sufficiently examined, despite consistent findings that instability and less 
than satisfactory performance of alliances and joint ventures are common. Notable 
exceptions are the studies by Pisano et al. (1988) and Oxley (1997) arguing that 
collaboration decisions are aligned with strategies to minimize transaction costs, 
particularly knowledge spillover hazards. In addition, management studies by Mowery et 
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al. (1996) and Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that the extent of overlap in the partners’ 
knowledge bases increases the potential to generate rents. Recent theoretical literature on 
endogenous spillovers (Kamien and Zang 2000) also has begun to examine knowledge 
leakage as a strategic variable and a cost related to collaboration.  
Here another explanation is proposed for why some firms are less likely than others to 
engage in external innovation activities. Collaborative R&D is always costly, because it 
entails investments of time and resources. However, the costs and benefits of collaborative 
projects are a function of the existence and scope of a firm’s complementary internal 
knowledge assets. Without sufficient internal knowledge assets, a firm will not be able to 
internalize and effectively utilize the knowledge created or accessed through collaboration 
(cf. Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Recognizing that employees’ skills and their collective 
experience, not only R&D, are an important component of absorptive capacity positions us 
to analyze the relationships between internal and external knowledge sources: Internal 
skills and accumulated knowledge of a firm reinforce the profitability effects of 
collaborative R&D, i.e., collaborative R&D is hypothesized to be complementary with 
internal knowledge. 
To summarize and formalize the hypotheses, we can specify a profit function for the firm. 
The firm maximizes profits with respect to skills (S), innovation (I), and R&D 
collaboration (C):  
(1) maxS, I, C Π = f(S, I, C, other firm and industry variables) 
The two hypotheses can be expressed in the following way:  
(2)  Π is supermodular in (S, I) and in (S, C). 2 
The profit-maximizing firm is taken here as the starting point, as opposed to productivity 
performance that has been the focus of most of the literature on skill-biased technical 
change. Indeed, an extension of this study could assess the productivity implications to 
create a benchmark against the skill-bias literature. 
                                                 
2 See Topkis (1998). 
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3 DATA  
The empirical analysis makes use of data from two Finnish innovation surveys, national 
business surveys, the register for domestic patent applications, and the employment 
register. The innovation survey datasets contain information about product and process 
innovations, R&D investments, and innovation collaboration during the periods 1989–1991 
(first survey administered in 1992; see SF 1992) and 1994–1996 (second survey 
administered in 1997; see SF 1998).3 Innovation and business survey questionnaires were 
sent to all manufacturing firms with more than one hundred employees and to a random 
sample stratified by size and industry for smaller firms. Response rates were about 70 
percent in both innovation surveys. The patent and employment registers cover all firms.  
From these sources, I constructed a panel dataset of 159 manufacturing firms over the 
period 1990–1996. To be included in the sample, firms must have participated in both 
innovation surveys and all or all but one of the annual business surveys for the period 
1990–1996.4 This construction creates some bias toward larger firms because large firms 
are slightly over-represented in the innovation surveys, and larger firms are both more 
likely to show up in the business surveys and survive over the seven-year period (Hall 
1987). All manufacturing industries at the two-digit industry classification level are 
included (see table 1 for industry breakdown). For comparison, table 1 also provides a 
breakdown for the representative innovation survey sample of 1,029 firms (weights 
provided by Statistics Finland are used to increase representativeness of the raw data). The 
printing and publishing industry appears to be slightly overrepresented in the smaller panel 
sample, possibly due to stable industry conditions leading to a higher probability of firms 
surviving, while the metal products industry is underrepresented. 
The period of study coincides with a sharp economic recession and subsequent recovery in 
Finland. This turbulence in the environment is reflected in firms’ behavior and 
performance. Several outliers were eliminated from the dataset due to dramatic changes in 
                                                 
3 Statistics Finland (SF) has adhered to the Eurostat guidelines for European Community Innovation Surveys 
in designing and implementing the Finnish innovation surveys. 
4 The missing observation has to be either the first or the last year. 
 8
firm size, profitability, or other variables.5 Because of these historical events, the analysis 
could alternatively be interpreted as a study of the factors of rapid recovery from a 
considerable external shock. Some of the estimation results may be weakened by this 
source of noise, however. 
Table 1 Industries 
Industry Dummy 
Variable 
NACE No. of 
observations 
in the sample
Share 
(%) 
No. of observations 
in the innovation 
survey  
Share 
(%) 
Food IND1 15-16 21 13.2  107 10.4  
Textile IND2 17-19 13 8.2  79 7.7  
Wood IND3 20 11 6.9  76 7.4  
Paper IND4 21 5 3.1  26 2.5  
Printing, publishing IND5 22 25 15.7 98 9.5  
Oil, chemical IND6 23-24 10 6.3  43 4.2  
Plastic, rubber   IND7 25 8 5.0  47 4.6  
Nonmetallic minerals IND8 26 4 2.5  44 4.3  
Primary metals IND9 27 6 3.8  26 2.5  
Metal products IND10 28 4 2.5  97 9.4  
Machines, equipment IND11 29 25 15.7 146 14.2  
Electronics IND12 30-33 16 10.1  133 12.9  
Cars, vehicles IND13 34-35 3 1.9  54 5.2  
Furniture IND14 36 8 5.0  53 5.2  
Total   159 100.0  1,029 100.0  
 
Estimation variables are listed and described in table 2 and descriptive statistics are 
displayed in table 3. The data are at the level of the firm, not business group. The 
dependent variable, operating profit margin is derived from the business survey 
information. It is a rather standard profitability measure (see e.g., Geroski et al. 1993). 
Operating profit levels tend to vary systematically across industries, which can be 
sufficiently controlled for with industry level variables. An average firm in the dataset had 
506 employees in 1995; 79 percent of the firms reported positive R&D expenditures that 
year and, on average, these R&D investing firms spent 1.8 percent of their sales revenue in 
R&D.6  
                                                 
5 “Dramatic” is defined as more than 100 percent growth or 50 percent reduction in sales or number of 
employees, or negative three-digit profit margins. 
6 There are some problems of distinguishing zeroes from missing data in the R&D survey information. Based 
on information about sampling procedures, a missing observation means that R&D investment is probably 
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Table 2  Variables 
Dependent Variable PROFIT Operating profit/sales 
Explanatory variables   
  Innovation  
  Activities 
INNO Innovation dummy (either product or process innovations in 1989–
1991 and either product or process innovations in 1994–1996) 
 COLLAB R&D collaboration dummy (firm collaborated with competitors, 
customers, suppliers or universities in 1989–1991 and in 1994–1996) 
 RDINV* Internal research and development investments/sales 
 RDDUM Dummy for R&D investment > 0    
  Skills TECH SKILL Share of employees with a higher technical or natural scientific degree 
(e.g., university engineer, master of  science in chemistry) 
 TECHDUM Dummy for value of TECH SKILL higher than the mean 
 PATENT* Number of domestic patent applications  
 RESEARCH* Share of employees with a post graduate degree (licentiate, Ph.D.) 
  Firm EMPLOYEES Number of employees 
 CAP-INT Capital intensity (fixed capital/sales) 
 MSHARE Domestic market share in the two-digit industry 
  Industry CONC3 Three-firm concentration ratio in the domestic two-digit industry 
 INDCAP-INT Average capital intensity in the industry 
 INDPATENT Average number of patents in the industry among patenting firms 
Notes: Data are available for 1990-1996 unless otherwise indicated. Variables marked with an asterisk are 
used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
 
Internal skills are proxied here by educational levels and fields of employees; 6.7 percent of 
the employees in an average firm have a higher university degree in technical or natural 
sciences.  
According to the 1992 innovation survey data, 61 percent of firms introduced new products 
in the markets (with positive sales revenue), 60 percent adopted new processes, and 56 
percent of firms engaged in collaborative R&D in the three years before that. In the 1997 
innovation questionnaire, the wording was changed to emphasize technological product and 
process innovations and perhaps partly for this reason the share of innovating firms 
dropped to 37 percent for product and 40 percent for process innovators. 47 percent of 
firms reported collaborating with customers, suppliers, universities, or competitors. 
                                                                                                                                                     
zero but I cannot be completely certain. Because of this potential measurement error, this variable is used 
mainly as an instrument in the econometric analysis. 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics  
  
Mean 
 
Std. Dev.
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
Mean for the Innovation Survey 
sample (1996; N=1,029, weighted) 
PROFIT (%) 7.5 8.5 -24.0 42.8 6.8 
EMPLOYEES  506 897.7 25 6650 98 
CAP-INT (%) 16.3 15.5 0.4 142.3 13.8 
MSHARE (%) 1.9 6.0 0.03 56.0 0.4 
PATENT 1.4 6.1 0 54 0.3 
RESEARCHER (%) 0.20 0.50 0 3.63 0.10 
TECH SKILL (%) 6.7 7.5 0.0 48.0 6.4 
TECHDUM 0.36 0.48 0 1 n.a. 
RDDUM 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.30 
RDINV (N=107) (%) 1.8 2.0 0.03 13.0 2.4 (N=400) 
INNO 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.19* 
COLLAB 0.34 0.48 0 1 0.22** 
INDCAP-INT (%) 15.6 5.3 9.9 28.9 14.8 
INDPATENT 2.8 2.4 0.0 8.9 3.7 
CONC3 (%) 26.7 10.9 8.8 50.2 34.8 
Notes: n.a. = not available. N = 159, year = 1995. 
* Either product or process innovations in 1996. 
** Collaboration in 1996. 
 
The  innovation and collaboration indicators used in the empirical analysis combine these 
survey variables. The INNO variable is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the firm 
introduced product or process innovations in both 1989–1991 and 1994–1996. Hence, the 
innovating firm may have introduced a product innovation in 1991 and a process 
innovation in 1996—mixed combinations are allowed. The idea is to find the consistent 
innovators in the sample. Similarly, the COLLAB dummy variable is 1 for firms that 
engaged in external collaboration according to both 1992 and 1997 surveys. 
Compared to the representative innovation survey sample of 1997 (1,029 firms unless 
otherwise indicated), as expected, the panel sample is considerably biased toward larger 
firms.  There is also a bias toward innovating firms. This can be attributed to survivor bias, 
because innovative firms generally perform better economically and therefore were more 
likely to survive the hard times of the Finnish economy in the early 1990s. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, although firms in the panel sample are much more likely to engage 
in R&D, their investments in R&D are smaller. This may relate to the size bias: smaller 
R&D performing firms are perhaps more likely to be highly R&D intensive (R&D 
investments per sales revenue). 
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Table 4 Innovator Profiles of Firms Investing in R&D  
 
 TECHDUM INNO COLLAB All R&D 
Investing Firms 
Non R&D 
Firms 
All Firms 
PROFIT (%) 9.8 9.8 8.8 8.2 6.1 7.5 
SALES (mill. FIM) 1324 1169 1494 889 197 663 
EMPLOYEES 790 780 915 633 245 506 
INNO 0.72 1 0.94 0.64 0.10 0.46 
COLLAB 0.68 0.70 1 0.49 0.04 0.34 
TECH SKILL (%) 13.5 8.8 10.2 8.1 3.9 6.7 
TECHDUM 1 0.51 0.65 0.47 0.15 0.36 
RDINV (%) 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.8 0 1.2 
N 50 73 54 107 52 159 
Notes: N = 159, Year = 1995. The three first columns present mean statistics for R&D firms, for which the 
respective innovation indicator is equal to 1.  
 
To examine the relationships among variables related to innovation activities, table 4 
provides a simple contingency table by displaying variable means for different kinds of 
R&D investing firms, non-investors, and all firms in the sample for 1995.7 The first three 
data columns show means of the variables on the left for firms that invested in R&D in 
1995 and engaged in the activity indicated at the head of the column. For example, the 
average sales of consistently innovating R&D active firms were FIM 1,169 million.  
Table 4 presents descriptive evidence that innovation activities and competencies tend to 
cluster. The first observation is that technical skills concentrate in firms that engage in 
innovation activities.8 Furthermore, firms that innovate tend to employ a very large number 
of highly educated engineers, 8.8 percent of employees compared to 8.1 percent for all 
R&D investing firms. Collaborating firms employ the most employees with higher 
technical education, 10.2 percent. The second observation is that innovating and 
collaborating firms, and particularly firms with high skill levels, invest more in R&D as a 
share of sales revenue than the larger group of all R&D investing firms. This suggests that 
returns to R&D investments are higher in the presence of high skills and collaboration. 
Third, collaboration increases firms’ likelihood of innovation. 94 percent of consistently 
                                                 
7 See table A3 in the appendix 1 for numbers of observations for different combinations of innovation and 
skill variables. 
8 Comparison with Finnish surveys of R&D personnel and investments indicates that most of these technical 
employees do not work in jobs directly related to R&D, but in production, sales, and other functions (SF 
2000). High skill levels thus reflect the overall higher knowledge intensity of R&D performing firms. 
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collaborating firms also innovated consistently, against 64 percent of all R&D investing 
firms. Thus, either collaboration increases innovativeness or benefits to collaboration and 
innovation both depend on some unobserved firm characteristics such as their other 
knowledge assets.9 Finally, profit margins tend to follow the same clustering pattern when 
compared across different groups of firms. Non-R&D-investing firms have the lowest profit 
margins, while R&D, collaboration, successful innovation, and high skills gradually 
improve the margins. However, firm size also appears to be highly correlated with the 
innovation and skill indicators, so controlling for that variable in the estimations is likely to 
be important. 
Table 5  Determinants of INNO and COLLAB 
Dependent variable: INNO COLLAB 
 Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error 
Constant -1.13** 0.19 -1.10** 0.20 
TECH SKILL 2.49** 0.51 3.19** 0.52 
EMPLOYEES 1.60** 0.25 1.61** 0.24 
MSHARE 0.01 0.05 -0.10* 0.06 
IND1 0.11 0.24 0.08 0.24 
IND2 0.16 0.24 0.05 0.25 
IND3 0.05 0.25 -0.42 0.27 
IND4 0.75** 0.36 0.51 0.37 
IND5 0.03 0.24 -0.38 0.25 
IND6 0.57* 0.31 0.13 0.32 
IND7 0.81** 0.26 0.64** 0.26 
IND8 0.22 0.27 0.06 0.28 
IND9 -0.02 0.40 0.33 0.38 
IND10 -0.02 0.23 0.00 0.23 
IND11 0.35 0.22 0.07 0.22 
IND12 0.59** 0.24 0.14 0.24 
IND13 0.13 0.28 -0.14 0.30 
Log Likelihood -600.90  -563.30  
McFadden’s pseudo R2 13%  15%  
% of correct predictions 72%  74%  
N 1056  1056  
Notes: Probit ML estimation. ** implies significance at the 95% level, * at the 90% level. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Correlations among the original variables and among the first-differenced variables to be used in the 
estimation can be found in tables A1 and A2 in appendix 1. 
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Table 6  Determinants of R&D intensity and TECH SKILL 
Dependent variable: RDINT  TECH SKILL 
 Coeff. Std. Error  Coeff. Std. Error 
Constant -0.12** 0.02 Constant -0.02 0.01 
TECH SKILL 0.47** 0.05 INNO 0.02 0.01 
EMPLOYEES 0.03** 0.01 COLLAB 0.05** 0.01 
MSHARE -0.01 0.01 EMPLOYEES 0.02** 0.01 
IND1 0.01 0.02 MSHARE 0.000 0.004 
IND2 -0.01 0.03 IND1 -0.04* 0.02 
IND3 -0.01 0.03 IND2 -0.01 0.02 
IND4 0.06 0.03 IND3 0.05** 0.02 
IND5 -0.04 0.03 IND4 0.03 0.03 
IND6 0.03 0.03 IND5 -0.03 0.02 
IND7 0.06** 0.03 IND6 0.10** 0.02 
IND8 0.01 0.03 IND7 0.01 0.02 
IND9 0.01 0.04 IND8 0.09** 0.02 
IND10 0.00 0.02 IND9 0.05 0.03 
IND11 0.02 0.02 IND10 0.05** 0.02 
IND12 0.03 0.02 IND11 0.08** 0.02 
IND13 0.00 0.03 IND12 0.12** 0.02 
   IND13 0.05** 0.02 
Log likelihood -1.22  Log likelihood 338.39  
Sigma 0.10 0.00 Sigma 0.10 0.00 
N 1056  N 1056  
Notes: Tobit ML estimation. ** implies significance at the 95% level, * at the 90% level. 
 
 
Tables 5 and 6 provide additional simple tests of multiple correlation between skills and 
innovation activities. These estimations were carried out with the larger innovation survey 
dataset of 1994–1996. The results indicate that skills significantly determine INNO and 
COLLAB. Table 6 shows results for Tobit estimations of the determinants of R&D 
intensity and those of technical skill levels. Firms with higher skill levels invest 
significantly more resources in R&D activities. Then reversing the direction of causation, 
technical skill levels are significantly determined by R&D collaboration. The insignificance  
of the INNO variable here is caused by the high multicollinearity between INNO and 
COLLAB.  
In summary, the data in table 4 are consistent with the proposition that there are 
complementarities among skills and innovation activities. Higher than average skills and 
R&D investments are observed in firms that innovate or collaborate. Profitability also 
correlates with innovation activities. The simple estimation results in tables 5 and 6 
demonstrate the strong mutual determination among technical skills, R&D, innovation, and 
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R&D collaboration, controlling for industry differences and firm size. However, these 
observations do not yet establish complementarity as they could be driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity. The next sections present an explicit test as to whether firms’ skills and 
innovation activities are indeed complementary in terms of their effects on profitability. 
 
4 ECONOMETRIC METHOD 
The econometric model is the following: 
(3) 1' ' ' '
E E P P
it it it it it i it tX X Yα β β γ µ ε δ−Π = Π + + + + + +   
Πit denotes profits for firm i in period t, XEit are the strictly exogenous industry level 
control variables, XPit are potentially predetermined firm-level explanatory variables, µi are 
unobserved firm-specific fixed effects, δt are time dummies, and εi are error terms. α, βE, 
βP, and γ are the parameters to be estimated. Yi is a vector of the interactions of the XPs to 
test for the presence of complementarities. In general, positive cross-partial derivatives of 
continuous Xi variables would imply complementarity. This is equivalent to the γ 
parameters being positive.10  
However, in the case of binary variables such as the innovation and collaboration 
indicators, simple interaction terms are not the best way to empirically identify potential 
complementarities. In particular, then the “mixed cases” are not identified. The 
identification strategy used here builds on Bresnahan et al. (1999). The starting point is the 
definition of supermodularity (complementarity) for a two-dimensional function f(x,y), 
where { }0,1x = and { }0,1y =  (see Topkis 1998, 45):  
(4) (1,1) (0,1) (1,0) (0,0)f f f f− ≥ −  
Supermodularity thus implies “increasing differences”: the effect of increasing x from 0 to 
1 is larger when y = 1 than when y = 0. In the estimation we can normalize f(0,0) = 0, and 
thus the empirical complementarity condition is: 
(5) (1,1) (0,1) (1,0)f f f≥ +  
                                                 
10 See appendix 2 for more discussion of the identification of complementarities. 
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Estimation will generate coefficients for mutually excluding dummies for the different 
combinations. Combinations include, for instance, high skill innovator (“high-high” 
combination), low skill innovator (“low-high”), and high skill non-innovators (“high-low”), 
while low skill non-innovator (“low-low”) is the reference case. A result in line with the 
complementarity condition (5) could then be interpreted to mean that the effect of 
introducing innovations on profitability is greater in the presence of high skills than in the 
presence of low skills.  
Generalized method of moments (GMM) for panel data is used for estimation in order to 
account for simultaneous or predetermined variables (see Arellano and Bond 1991; 
Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). A dynamic model with predetermined 
explanatory variables leads to inconsistent estimates with such methods as fixed effects or 
three-stage least squares. To control for fixed effects, with which the Xs may correlate, the 
model can be estimated in first differences: 
(6) 1' ' ' '
E E P P
it it it it it it tX X Yα β β γ ε δ−∆Π = ∆Π + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆  
Some of the firm-level variables are likely to be predetermined, that is, correlated with the 
previous period’s error term, rather than strictly exogenous. Therefore, some undesirable 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error terms may still remain. 
Instruments are used to correct for this. Values of the dependent variable lagged two or 
more periods are valid instruments, because the model is dynamic (AR1). The values of 
explanatory variables lagged one or more periods are also valid. The orthogonality 
conditions are: 
(7) E(Πi,t-s∆εit) = 0   for t=3,…,T and s ≥ 2.  
E(Xi,t-s∆εit) = 0   for t=3,…,T and s ≥ 1. 
Additionally, current exogenous variables XE are valid instruments. Second-order serial 
uncorrelation of the error terms is required for the consistency of this model. The Sargan 
test statistic of overidentifying restrictions (stacked instrumental variables) is also reported 
with the results (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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Arellano and Bover (1995) argued that first-differenced estimation loses information 
particularly useful with short panels. They propose a system method that estimates the level 
equations together with the differenced equations to increase precision. Then lagged first 
differences are used as instruments for the level equations, and lagged levels are used as 
instruments for the differenced equations.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) found that the system estimator can alleviate the problem of 
weak instruments in cases where α is close to one. Moreover, this estimator preserves 
information from the level equations enabling the identification of time-invariant effects. 
This is essential when applied to the cross-sectional innovation variables in this study.11 
The additional moment conditions are: 
(8) E(εit∆Πi,t-1) = 0  for t = 3,4,…,T 
E(εit∆Xi,t-1) = 0    for t = 3,…,T  
The requirement for the validity of the instruments for the level equations is that they be 
uncorrelated with the fixed effect. Validity of these moment conditions will be tested with 
the Difference Sargan test, comparing the instruments for the differenced estimator with 
those for the system estimator.  
5  ESTIMATION RESULTS  
The objective of the econometric analysis is to test for complementarities among firms’ 
skills, innovation, and collaborative R&D. Estimation results for the specification without 
interaction effects are shown in table 7 to provide a base case. For comparison, the model is 
estimated here with both the standard fixed effects method, one-step differenced GMM 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and one-step system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995). 12  
All specifications include a set of standard economic control variables: lagged dependent 
variable, size proxied by number of employees, capital intensity, market share, three-firm 
concentration ratio, and capital intensity in the industry. Among these, lagged profitability, 
                                                 
11 Time invariant effects are “differenced” away in the difference equations, and only included in the level 
equations. They are instrumented with lagged differences of the skill variables, which are valid because they 
are likely to correlate with the innovation activities but not with the fixed effect. 
12 See appendix 2 for the differences between the one-step and two-step system estimators. 
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firm size, capital intensity, and market share are assumed to be predetermined 
(endogenous) variables, and they are instrumented in the differenced and system 
estimations. In addition, patenting intensity in the industry and full sets of year dummies 
are used as control variables.  
Table 7 Baseline Regressions (1992–1996, N_max = 159, T = 5, N*T = 781) 
 Fixed Effects Differenced 1-Step System 1-Step System 1-Step 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
CONST -1.81** 0.49 0.90 0.60 3.26** 1.38 2.26 1.83 
PROFIT-1 0.09* 0.04 0.17** 0.07 0.50** 0.06 0.44** 0.06 
EMPLOYEES -0.002** 0.001 -0.01** 0.002 -0.001* 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 
CAP-INTENSITY -0.06 0.04 -0.12** 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 
MSHARE 15.13** 6.93 16.57** 7.56 12.68* 7.66 15.77** 7.44 
CONC3 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05* 0.03 0.04 0.03 
INDCAP-INTENSITY -0.31** 0.10 -0.20** 0.10 -0.09 0.08 -0.05 0.09 
INDPATENT -0.31* 0.18 -0.30* 0.16 -0.12 0.13 -0.24 0.15 
TECHDUM       1.01 2.02 
INNO       0.76 3.47 
COLLAB       3.08 4.41 
1st order serial 
correlation (p) 
 
-5.19 
 
(0.00) -4.39 (0.00) -5.92 (0.00) -5.66 (0.00) 
2nd order serial 
correlation (p) 
 
-0.97 
 
(0.33) -0.77 (0.44) -0.44 (0.66) -0.55 (0.59) 
Sargan test (p)    72.3  
(d.f. 68) (0.34) 
126.4  
(d.f. 117) (0.26) 
126.4 (d.f. 
114) (0.20) 
Difference Sargan (p)     54.1  
(d.f. 49) 
(0.29)   
 
Notes: Estimations are carried out with the DPD98 for Gauss by Arellano and Bond. Dependent variable: 
operating profit margin (PROFIT). Specifications include time dummies.  
Instruments for the differenced equations (differenced and system estimators): Const, PROFIT(gmm), 
EMPLOYEES(gmm), CAP-INT (gmm), MSHARE(gmm), PATENT(gmm), RESEARCHER(gmm), TECH 
SKILL(gmm), CONC3, INDCAP-INT, INDPATENT. “gmm”-instruments are the stacked, overidentifying 
moment restrictions as in (7) above. A maximum of three lags are used.  
Instruments for the level equations in the system estimator include differences of the following variables: 
PROFIT-3, EMPLOYEES-2, CAP-INT-2, MSHARE-2, CONC3, INDCAP-INT, INDPATENT, PATENT-2, 
RES-2, TECH SKILL-2, RDINV -2. Two first levels equations are omitted for lack of instruments. 
** denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.  
 
The three estimation methods agree on most signs of the coefficients, but the levels of 
significance vary. The system estimator is better able to identify the dynamic process 
(lagged dependent variable). This lends support for the previously discussed theoretical 
advantages of the system estimator. The discrepancies between the results with differenced 
and system estimators could in principle reflect the nonstationarity of the dataset (see 
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Blundell and Bond 1998, 124). However, based on their Monte Carlo simulations, Blundell 
and Bond suggest that the Sargan test is able to detect problems related to this. In table 7 
the Difference Sargan test assessing the validity of the additional moment conditions 
defined by (8) does not indicate these kinds of specification problems. This test will also 
reject in case the overidentifying moment conditions for the level equations are not valid in 
terms of correlation with the error terms. Hence, no specification problems are indicated 
vis-à-vis the system estimation method. 
Also in line with Blundell and Bond’s results, the one-step system estimator possibly 
somewhat inflates standard errors.13 Therefore, coefficients that are significant with the 
one-step procedure used here are likely to be strongly statistically associated with the 
dependent variable, but this test may be too strict. In spite of this, Blundell and Bond 
recommend the one-step results instead of the efficient two-step ones, which deflate 
standard errors and may produce “too” significant coefficients, particularly if the data are 
heteroskedastic.  
The last specification in table 7 using the system estimator includes the dummy variables 
that describe skills and innovation activities. All of these indicators have positive signs, as 
one would expect, but they are not close to being statistically significant. However, 
multicollinearity may play a role there. 
The specifications in table 7 account for industry differences with three variables: 
concentration ratio, capital intensity, and patenting intensity. To assess their ability to 
control for industry-specificities the system equation was estimated with a full set of 
industry dummies instead of the aforementioned industry variables (see tables A4 and A5 
in appendix 3). The results suggest that the three industry controls used here account better, 
or at least as well, for industry-specificities than do the industry dummies.14  
Finally, to examine the performance of the instruments the model was estimated with 
system GMM but lagging the predetermined variables’ GMM-instruments by two 
(employees, market share, capital intensity) and three periods (patenting and skill variables) 
                                                 
13 The one-step weighting matrix is arbitrary, which can have considerable effects in finite samples.  
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instead of by one and two periods, respectively. This had no substantial effect on the 
results.  
Subsequent analysis is based on the system estimator, using industry control variables 
instead of dummies. Fixed effects results will not be considered, because they are 
inconsistent for the dynamic model and cannot identify the time-invariant innovation 
dummy variables. The latter also applies for the differenced estimator. 
5.1 Testing for Complementarities: Innovation and Skills 
The specifications in the rest of the paper have exactly the same control variables and 
instruments as the baseline equation in table 7. Skills are measured with the dummy for 
high technical competencies TECHDUM. The estimation results in table 8 indicate that 
these competencies support the benefits of innovation. Positive profitability effects of 
innovation are stronger in the presence of high technical skills. The interaction term for the 
(1,1) combination is strong and statistically significant, implying that innovating firms with 
high technical skills attain a profit margin increase of almost five percentage points 
compared to their non-innovating, low-skill counterparts. This suggests that firms also need 
absorptive capacity to benefit from their internal innovation activities. 
5.2 Collaborative R&D and Competencies 
Internal skills were also hypothesized to be prerequisite to benefiting from collaborative 
R&D. The original absorptive capacity proposition by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
concerned the role of R&D in learning about external technological developments. The 
results here indicate that skills and accumulated competencies are also important in making 
use of external knowledge: technical skills significantly complement collaborative 
innovation arrangements (table 9).  
                                                                                                                                                     
14 Time dummies interacted with industry dummies would be an even stronger test, but the estimation with 
thirteen dummies for four periods as explanatory variables and instruments generates too large a matrix for 
Gauss to handle. 
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Table 8 Interactions between Technical Competencies and Innovation Outcomes  
 Coeff. Std. Err. 
CONST 2.55 1.89 
PROFIT-1 0.45** 0.06 
EMPLOYEES -0.002** 0.001 
CAP-INT 0.05 0.04 
MSHARE 14.43** 7.23 
CONC3 0.04 0.04 
INDCAP-INT -0.08 0.08 
INDPATENT -0.27* 0.15 
TECH SKILL high & innovator  4.96** 2.52 
TECH SKILL low & innovator  1.75 4.03 
TECH SKILL high & non-innovator  0.92 3.12 
1nd order serial correlation (p) -5.81 (0.0) 
2nd order serial correlation (p) -0.56 (0.57) 
Sargan test (p), d.f. 110 105.1 (0.62) 
Notes: See notes about specification and instrumentation in table 7.  
One-step GMM system estimator, N*T = 781, 1992–1996.  
** denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.  
 
Table 9 Interactions between Technical Competencies and Innovation 
Collaboration  
 Coeff. Std. err.
CONST 2.92* 1.67 
PROFIT-1 0.44** 0.07 
EMPLOYEES -0.002** 0.001 
CAP-INT 0.04 0.04 
MSHARE 14.63** 7.32 
CONC3 0.04 0.03 
INDCAP-INT -0.05 0.08 
INDPATENT -0.23 0.15 
TECH SKILL high & collaborator  5.61** 2.86 
TECH SKILL high & non-collaborator  -1.22 3.08 
TECH SKILL low & collaborator  1.39 3.48 
1st order serial correlation (p) -5.61 (0.00) 
2nd order serial correlation (p) -0.56 (0.58) 
Sargan test (p) d.f. 110 104.49 (0.63) 
Notes: The same estimation method, control variables and instruments were used as in table 7.  
One-step GMM system estimator, N*T = 781, 1992–1996. 
** denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.  
 
 21
Table 10 examines the possibility that collaboration and innovation might complement one 
another as well. Indeed, estimation results are supportive of this proposition: A strongly 
positive interaction term is found. In fact, the negative coefficients for the mixed cases 
suggest that firms may be better off staying put rather than trying to innovate without 
collaborating, and vice versa. However, these negative coefficients are not statistically 
significant. 
Table 10 Interactions between Innovation and Collaboration  
 Coeff. Std. err. 
CONST 2.15 2.00 
PROFIT-1 0.45** 0.07 
EMPLOYEES -0.003** 0.001 
CAP-INTENSITY 0.04 0.04 
MSHARE 15.71** 7.07 
CONC3 0.04 0.03 
INDCAP-INTENSITY -0.05 0.09 
INDPAT -0.24* 0.14 
Innovator & collaborator  6.86** 2.82 
Innovator & non-collaborator  -2.10 9.88 
Non-innovator & collaborator  -1.78 4.29 
1st order serial correlation (p) -5.69 (0.00) 
2nd order serial correlation (p) -0.55 (0.58) 
Sargan test (p), d.f. 110 106.88 (0.57) 
Notes: The same estimation method, control variables and instruments were used as in table 7.  
One-step GMM system estimator, N*T = 781, 1992–1996. 
** denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.  
 
5.3 Complementarity Tests 
Here I provide a simple test for the complementarity hypotheses specified earlier in 
equations (1) and (2). It statistically tests whether the complementarity condition (5) is 
satisfied by the coefficients in tables 8–10. It turns out that the tests reject the 
complementarity hypotheses at conventional levels of significance. The standard errors on 
the mixed cases are prohibitively high, even though the coefficients themselves clearly 
align with the hypotheses. Hence, the complementarity results are not as statistically strong 
as the positive interaction terms suggest. It is possible that the numbers of observations for 
the mixed cases are too low to generate sufficiently precise estimation results.  
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Table 11  Complementarity Tests for Estimated Coefficients 
INNO & TECH SKILL  4.96 (2.52) > 1.75 (4.03) + 0.92 (3.12) p = 0.34 
TECH SKILL & COLLAB 5.61 (2.86) > -1.22 (3.08) + 1.39 (3.48) p = 0.16 
INNO & COLLAB 6.86 (2.82) > -2.10 (9.88) – 1.78 (4.29) p = 0.17 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
5.4 “Systemic” Interactions among Collaborative R&D, Skills, and Innovation 
The last set of estimations takes a more systemic approach and simultaneously examines 
interactions among the innovation, collaboration, and skill variables. In the previous 
subsections, firms’ skill levels were found to reinforce the profitability effects of 
collaboration and innovation output, and innovation and collaboration were found to 
reinforce one another. A potential weakness of the estimation approach is that interactions 
are assessed separately, because the two-way interaction dummies for skills and innovation, 
for instance, cannot really be identified simultaneously with those for collaboration and 
skills.  
One way to assess the nature of interactions among several variables is to construct 
mutually excluding dummies for all the possible combinations. However, this method 
aggravates the issue that when the complementarity is strong, most observations are likely 
to cluster into the combinations (1,1,1) and (0,0,0) leaving few observations of mixed 
combinations. For example, table 12 shows the number of observations for each three-way 
combination for the variables TECH SKILL, COLLAB, and INNO. Indeed, thirty-three 
firms engage in all activities exhibiting the combination (1,1,1) and sixty-four firms engage 
in none of the activities and thus have the combination (0,0,0). In addition, the 
combinations (0,1,1), (1,0,0), and (0,0,1) each receive eighteen or nineteen observations. 
Other combinations have very few observations—in particular, the combination of low 
skills, collaboration, and no innovation (0,1,0) features only one firm. Estimation based on 
these observations would not give reliable results. 
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Table 12 Observations for the Combinations of Technical Skills, Collaboration, 
and Innovation  
 N 
TECH SKILL high, COLLAB = 1, INNO = 1 33 
TECH SKILL high, COLLAB = 1, INNO = 0 2 
TECH SKILL high, COLLAB = 0, INNO = 1 4 
TECH SKILL low, COLLAB = 1, INNO = 1 18 
TECH SKILL high, COLLAB = 0, INNO = 0 19 
TECH SKILL low, COLLAB = 1, INNO = 0 1 
TECH SKILL low, COLLAB = 0, INNO = 1 18 
TECH SKILL low, COLLAB = 0, INNO = 0 64 
Total 159 
 
To examine whether the three variables—technical skills, consistent R&D collaboration, 
and consistent innovation—form a mutually reinforcing system, I simplify the 
complementarity condition to enable identification. Here the hypothesis is that these three 
activities are more profitable when observed together (1,1,1) than when observed in any 
other combination, resulting in a kind of a condition for “systemic” effects (cf. Ichniowski 
et al. 1997): 
f(1,1,1) ≥ f(1,x2,x3)    where xi = 0 for at least some i = 2,3. 
(9) f(1,1,1) ≥ f(x1,1,x3) where xi = 0 for at least some i = 1,3. 
f(1,1,1) ≥ f(x1,x2,1) where xi = 0 for at least some i = 1,2. 
For example, (1,x2,x3) refers to a dummy variable for firms that have high skills but either 
lack INNO or COLLAB or both. Again, the reference case is (0,0,0). Table 13 presents the 
estimation results. The variable (1,1,1) thus refers to the combination with all four dummy 
variables obtaining the value of 1. In line with the hypothesis, the (1,1,1) combination has 
the largest and most significant coefficient. In addition, COLLAB has a positive 
coefficient, but is statistically insignificant. The other variables obtain insignificant 
negative coefficients. Thus it appears that having all three innovation characteristics does 
pay off quite well: firms that succeed in both hiring and retaining highly skilled employees, 
collaborating in R&D with other organizations, and introducing new products or processes 
consistently earn a boost in profit margin of an additional 7.4 percentage points. Comparing 
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this number to results in table 10 shows that adding high TECH SKILLS to INNO and 
COLLAB results in an additional 0.5 percentage point benefit in terms of profit margin. 
Table 13 Interactions among Technical Skills, Collaboration, and Innovation  
 Coeff. Std. err. N 
CONST 2.82 2.02  
PROFIT-1 0.42** 0.07  
EMPLOYEES -0.003** 0.001  
CAP-INT 0.03 0.04  
MSHARE 15.84** 7.32  
CONC3 0.04 0.03  
INDCAP-INT -0.05 0.08  
INDPAT -0.24 0.15  
(1,1,1) 7.39** 2.82 33 
TECH SKILL high, not (1,1,1) -1.55 3.09 25 
COLLAB, not (1,1,1) 3.32 5.06 56 
INNO, not (1,1,1) -0.03 3.84 41 
1st order serial correlation (p) -5.53 (0.00)  
2nd order serial correlation (p) -0.58 (0.57)  
Sargan test (p) d.f. 109 106.45 (0.55)  
Notes: The same estimation method, control variables and instruments were used as in table 7.  
One-step GMM system estimator, N*T = 781, 1992–1996. 
** denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.  
 
 
Now the last column does not add up to 159 as the dummies for TECH SKILL high, 
COLLAB, and INNO but not (1,1,1) are not mutually excluding. They only exclude the 
firms with all activities present, i.e., (1,1,1). 
The modified complementarity test in table 14 now requires that the coefficient on (1,1,1) 
is significantly larger than other dummy coefficients. This is strongly statistically supported 
by the result on TECHDUM: the benefits from high skills in this framework really appear 
through their use in innovation activities (significance 98 percent). The result on INNO is 
significant at the 94 percent level, while that on COLLAB is significant only at the 76 
percent level. 
Table 14 Tests for Systemic Effects 
TECHDUM 7.39 (2.82) > -1.55 (3.12) p = 0.02 
COLLAB 7. 39 (2.82) > 3.32 (5.06) p = 0.24 
INNO 7. 39 (2.82) > -0.03 (3.84) p = 0.06 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 25
Note, however, that this approach is not, strictly speaking, based on the theory of 
supermodularity. The results concern only the interactions between the individual variable 
and the rest of the “system,” not the pairwise interactions between all the elements of the 
system. Thus these results do not imply that profits are supermodular with respect to 
TECHDUM and INNO. Rather, having high skills is significantly more valuable in the 
presence of COLLAB and INNO. 
In summary, the estimation results provide support for the hypotheses that technical 
competencies help firms to profit from both innovation and collaboration, and that they 
may be as important as R&D in building absorptive capacity. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients—which must be treated as suggestive at best—imply that adopting the set of 
complementary competencies and activities boosts the firm’s profit margin by some five to 
seven percentage points. Thus innovation may have substantial effects on firm 
performance, but realization of these effects depends on complementary skills. The 
insignificance of the explicit complementarity tests, however, represents a caveat. 
Improving precision in the estimation of the mixed cases may require a larger dataset. 
 
6   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper subscribes to the view that a firm’s knowledge assets affect its profitability. 
Knowledge is accumulated by investing in various learning processes, including internal 
and collaborative R&D and the hiring of skilled employees. In addition to examining the 
profitability effects of firm-level competence measures and innovation activities, this study 
explicitly focuses on the interactions among them. Identifying complementarities sheds 
new light on the effects of organization on firms’ innovative and economic performance.  
The main results are the following. First, consistent innovation alone is not a significant 
explanatory factor of profitability. Both technical competencies and R&D collaboration 
reinforce the profitability effects of innovation. Second, collaborative R&D has stronger 
positive economic effects when the firm possesses high technical competencies. Third, 
these positive interactions represent a system wherein technical skills, collaboration, and 
innovation reinforce one another. These results suggest that complementarities exist 
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between competencies and innovation activities, and that the choice of how to organize 
innovation activities matters. In particular, the positive interaction between internal and 
collaborative innovation activities suggest that outsourcing R&D services is likely to have 
minor effects on firm performance without internal skills and R&D activities. In other 
words, choices related to the organization of R&D activities may be characterized by 
“make and buy” (Veugelers and Cassiman 1999) as opposed to the classical transaction 
cost question of make or buy. 
A potential issue with the dataset is that performance is measured at the same time that 
innovation and R&D collaboration occur. The panel of profitability used in the estimation 
extends from 1992 to 1996 (observations from 1990 and 1991 are used as instruments), 
while the second innovation survey concerns the period 1994–1996. Thus all performance 
implications of innovation may not have yet materialized by the end of 1996. This is the 
reason for constructing the consistent innovation dummy for firms innovating in both 
1989–1991 and 1994–1996: these firms have the “habit” of innovating successfully. 
Nevertheless, there may remain some timing issues in terms of the realization of the 
innovation returns. An additional factor for consideration is that the time period studied 
involved dramatic changes in the economic environment due to a recession between 1990 
and 1993. This may be reflected in the results that smaller and less capital intensive firms 
are more profitable. Testing the predictions with a more stable dataset would be useful. 
Finally, the dataset may not be cross-sectionally large enough to enable sufficiently precise 
estimation of the “mixed cases,” that is, profitability of firms that innovate but have low 
skills or vice versa. Despite these data concerns, relevant results emerge and may be 
interpreted as reflecting conditions under which firms benefit rapidly from innovation and 
recover from recessions in a timely manner. 
This study sheds new light on the economic effects of collaborative innovation among 
firms. Theoretical work in the economics of research joint ventures has ignored the central 
role of internal skills within these arrangements. In particular, not all firms are equally 
capable of synthesizing knowledge from various sources. Empirical studies of the impact of 
collaborative innovation on firm performance are scarce and biased toward success stories. 
However, high failure rates of collaborative arrangements observed in the available studies 
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suggest that it is difficult to benefit from collaboration. Findings here show that internal 
competencies and innovation activities complement external collaboration strategies and 
thus may be prerequisites of successful collaboration.  
The findings have relevance for technology policy. Subsidies for R&D or promotion of 
consortia may disappoint unless targeted firms possess the requisite complementary skills. 
Policies can focus either on picking winners—in other words, supporting R&D by firms 
with existing high levels of skill—or on supporting the development of complementary 
knowledge simultaneously with innovation activities. The latter approach expands the set 
of potentially successful innovators in the economy. Hence, in addition to being a factor in 
adopting information technology, upskilling helps firms to succeed in consistent innovation 
and sourcing of knowledge from external partners. Skill-biased technical change may be 
driven by both technology adoption and technology creation. 
 APPENDIX 1able A1  Correlations among the Original Variables, 1995, N = 159 
 SALES EMPLOYEES CAP-INT MSHARE PROFIT PAT RESEARCH TECH 
SKILL 
TECH- 
DUM 
RD-DUM INNO COLLAB IND CAP-
INT 
INDPAT 
SALES 1              
EMPLOYEES 0.71 1             
CAP-INT -0.01 0.04 1            
MSHARE 0.85 0.79 0.03 1           
PROFIT -0.01 0.05 0.22 0.04 1          
PAT 0.52 0.46 -0.05 0.32 -0.06 1         
RESEARCH 0.25 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.19 1        
TECH SKILL 0.18 0.16 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.29 0.27 1       
TECHDUM 0.17 0.19 0.01 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.71 1      
RDDUM 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.19 1     
INNO 0.19 0.28 0.12 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.26 0.27 0.41 1.00    
COLLAB 0.24 0.33 0.18 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.70 1.00   
INDCAP-INT 0.14 -0.03 0.31 0.10 0.13 -0.09 0.16 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.11 -0.17 1  
INDPAT 0.15 0.12 -0.12 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.11 0.44 0.46 0.21 0.27 0.28 -0.22 1 
CONC3 0.25 0.20 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.33 0.36 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.33 0.70 
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Table A2 Correlations among the Differenced Variables 1992–1996, N_max = 159 
 dPROF dPROF(-1) dEMPL-
OYEES
dCAPINT dMSHAR
E 
dCONC3 dINDCAP-
INT 
dINDPAT
dPROF 1        
dPROF(-1 -0.29 1       
dEMPLOYEES 0 -0.01 1      
dCAP-INT -0.16 0 -0.06 1     
dMSHARE 0.09 0.05 0.1 -0.03 1    
dCONC3 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.13 -0.06 1   
dINDCAP-INT -0.17 -0.03 0.01 0.21 -0.01 -0.27 1  
dINDPAT -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.1 -0.04 1 
TECHDUM -0.07 0 0.05 0.06 -0.11 0.02 0.08 -0.06 
COLLAB -0.04 0 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.02 0 0.03 
INNO -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.03 0.01 0.04 
RDDUM -0.02 -0.01 0 0.04 -0.1 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Note: d indicates first-differenced variables.  
 
Table A3  Observations for the Different Innovator Profiles  
 
 Innovator Non-
innovator 
Collaborator Non-
collaborator 
High 
skills 
Low 
skills 
N 
Collaborator 51 3     54 
Non-collaborator 22 83     105 
High skills 37 21 35 23   58 
Low skills 36 65 19 82   101 
R&D 71 55 53 73 52 74 126 
No R&D 2 31 1 32 6 27 33 
N 73 86 54 105 58 101 159 
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APPENDIX 2 
Identification of Complementarities  
According to Arora (1996) there are two problems in identifying complementarities in a 
cross-sectional dataset. First, Xi and Xj may appear to be complements, even though they 
are not in reality, if each is positively related to an omitted variable. Second, Xi and Xj may 
appear negatively associated, even though they are complements in reality, if there is 
another variable, that is a complement of Xi and a substitute of Xj.  Since the data on 
innovation outcomes here are effectively cross-sectional too, the same problems may be an 
issue. In particular, since the innovation outcomes are measured as dummies, which may be 
correlated with the unobserved characteristics, it is possible that the interaction effects are 
biased upward. However, this is not really different from the usual problem of omitted 
variables. Using the system approach mitigates this problem to the extent that the 
unobserved heterogeneity correlated with innovation indicators is captured by the firm 
fixed effect. 
Apart from the fixed effect, the approach here with respect to Arora’s observations is 
pragmatic. By instrumenting with the competence factors that correlate with innovativeness 
(technical and research skills, past innovation activities; see notes for table 7), I attempt to 
control for the “technological capability” that would otherwise confound the decisions to 
invest in R&D, engage in R&D collaboration, and innovate.15 The second point raised by 
Arora is another case of the omitted variable problem. One scenario in which this would 
arise is when internal R&D activities are a substitute with external collaborative R&D, 
while they complement benefiting from innovation output. This is controlled for by using 
past investments in R&D (differenced) as an instrument for the level equation. Indeed, 
introducing this instrument strengthens the interaction coefficients, implying that the 
system might be characterized by both complementarities and substitutabilities. 
Athey and Stern (1998) also discuss testing for organizational complementarities. They 
suggest controlling for the biases arising from unobserved heterogeneity by a system of 
equations approach.  They propose a framework for estimating simultaneously the 
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“adoption equations”—in this case the determination of competencies, innovation, and 
R&D collaboration—and the main equation of interest, here the profitability equation (1). 
In the current study, the panel data approach controls for unobserved firm fixed effects that 
is the source of bias in the cross-sectional framework discussed by Athey and Stern.  
Generalized Method of Moments for Dynamic Panel Data 
The two-step estimation procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is the 
following. The estimator  
(9)  1ˆ ( ' ' ) ' 'N NX ZA Z X X ZA Zδ −= ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Π     
is used with respect to equation (1) in two stages, first utilizing an initial weights matrix  
(10)  
1
1 '
1
N
N i i
i
A N Z HZ
−
−
=
 =   ∑  
with (T-2)×(T-2) matrix 
(11)  
2 1 0 ... 0
1 2 1 ... 0
0 1 2 ... 0
... ... ... ... 1
0 0 0 1 2
H
−  − −  = − −  − 
 
which is then replaced in the second step by the estimate uiui’: 
(12)  
1^^
1 ' '
1
N
N i i i i
i
A N Z u u Z
−
−
=
 =   ∑  
where ui’ are residuals from the one-step estimation. This estimator is asymptotically 
efficient in its class. However, it is well known that for finite samples this estimator 
deflates the standard errors, especially in the presence of heteroskedasticity, which is likely 
to be the case here (Blundell and Bond, 1998, appendix A). Blundell and Bond recommend 
the one-step estimates as “empirically right,” even though the estimator is inefficient.  
                                                                                                                                                     
15 The competence and other firm level variables used here provided a reasonable prediction of innovation 
outcomes in Leiponen 2001 
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APPENDIX 3 
Table A4 Baseline Regressions with Industry Dummies 
 System 1-step 
 Coeff. Std. error 
CONST 2.09** 0.75 
PROFIT-1 0.44** 0.06 
EMPLOYEES -0.001 0.001 
CAP-INTENSITY 0.02 0.03 
MSHARE 7.22 7.41 
Time dummies:  
1993 0.11 0.71 
1994 1.29* 0.69 
1995 1.07 0.80 
1996 0.28 0.86 
Industry dummies: 
IND2 1.74 1.40 
IND3 -0.97 1.30 
IND4 3.97** 1.92 
IND5 0.57 0.70 
IND6 2.63** 1.19 
IND7 3.04** 1.34 
IND8 1.73 3.54 
IND9 1.64 2.26 
IND10 0.56 1.43 
IND11 1.57* 0.87 
IND12 1.00 1.13 
IND13 3.85 3.40 
IND14 0.30 1.33 
1st order serial correlation (p) -5.69 (0.00) 
2nd order serial correlation (p) -0.51 (0.61) 
Sargan test (p) d.f. 99 108.5 (0.24) 
Notes: Instruments are the same as in table 7, except for the industry variables. Here industry dummies are 
used as instruments. One-step GMM system estimator, N*T = 781, 1992–1996. 
** denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.  
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Table A5 Results of Table 8 with Industry Dummies  
 System 1-step 
 Coeff. Std. error 
CONST 3.26 2.19 
PROFIT-1 0.37** 0.07 
EMPLOYEES -0.002** 0.001 
CAP-INTENSITY 0.002 0.03 
MSHARE 6.17 6.63 
TECH SKILL high & innovator  8.95** 3.50 
TECH SKILL high & non-innovator  -2.20 4.31 
TECH SKILL low & innovator  -1.32 4.41 
Time dummies:  
1993 0.24 0.69 
1994 1.49** 0.70 
1995 1.32 0.86 
1996 0.52 0.87 
Industry dummies: 
IND2 1.08 2.04 
IND3 -0.74 1.53 
IND4 4.81* 2.63 
IND5 0.57 1.44 
IND6 1.09 3.29 
IND7 -2.22 2.42 
IND8 3.03 4.23 
IND9 0.12 3.20 
IND10 0.52 1.98 
IND11 -2.35 1.83 
IND12 -3.41 2.12 
IND13 0.32 2.49 
IND14 0.24 1.78 
1st order serial correlation (p) -5.47 (0.00) 
2nd order serial correlation (p) -0.59 (0.56) 
Sargan test (p) d.f. 96 97.6 (0.44) 
Notes: Instruments are the same as in table 7, except for the industry variables. Here industry dummies are 
used as instruments. One-step GMM system estimator, N*T = 781, 1992–1996. 
** denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90 percent level.  
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